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A SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS: EVALUATING THE LATEST
ANTI-STALKING DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE MODEL STALKING CODE
KIMBERLY A. TOLHURST*
Beatings by men are the leading cause of injury for American
women.' Many people ask why these women do not leave their
batterers. The answer often has its roots in the crime of stalking.
As the mother of a battered woman who was stalked and mur-
dered by her abuser explains, "People ask 'Why don't battered
women leave?' They get killed. That's why."2 Unwilling to relin-
quish control, "batterers [can] become stalkers, pursuing their
victims after the victims leave the abusive relationship."3 Stalking
is a problem faced not only by domestic violence victims or
women in general. Virtually anyone can fall prey to a stalker.
First, this Comment will define stalking and explain the ur-
gency of the issue. Second, it will discuss and evaluate the
stalking laws developed by the states. Third, it will -compare the
state laws with the National Institute of Justice Model Anti-
Stalking Code for States in order to determine which provisions
best protect stalking victims.
I. STALKING DEFINED
Most states define stalking as the "willful, malicious, and re-
peated following and harassing of another person."4 Although
stalking can happen to anyone, it usually occurs in one of two
contexts.5 The first type involves stalkers who do not know their
victims or have only a passing acquaintance with the victim.6
* J.D. Candidate 1995, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
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1. George Lardner, After the Murder, Massachusetts Gets a Common-Sense Law, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at C3.
2. Ann Jones, Why Doesn't She Leave?, MIRABELLA, Nov. 1993, at 180.
3. Laurie Salame, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to
the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 85 (1993).
4. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE
FOR STATES: RESEARCH REPORT 13 (1993) [hereinafter NIJ RESEARCH REPORT]; Silvija A.
Strikis, Note, Stopping Stalking, 81 GEO. L.J. 2771, 2782 (1993).
5. Lowell T. Woods, Jr., Note, Anti-Stalker Legislation: A Legislative Attempt to
Surmount the Inadequacies of Protective Orders, 27 IND. L. REv. 449, 450 (1993).
6. Id.
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This type is called erotomania, or "phantom lover syndrome.17
The far more prevalent type of stalking behavior is part of a
cycle of domestic violence and occurs when a lover or spouse is
rejected.8
Stalking horrifies its victims and often makes it impossible for
them to conduct their daily lives in a normal fashion. Anecdotal
evidence from stalking victims reveals the many forms that
stalking can take, from calling, writing, and making threats to
following and carrying out actual attacks.9 Pennsylvania prose-
cutor Barbara Jo Cohan was stalked for twenty years by a man
she counseled during her "short career as a psychiatric social
worker."10 The stalker believed that he had a romantic relation-
ship with Cohan and repeatedly told her he wanted her to bear
his children.11 He even wrote a letter to her supervisor, explaining
how much Cohan loved him.12 The ceaseless stalking played a
large role in Cohan's decision to go to law school. "In 1974,"
Cohan explained, "I had judges telling me [that being stalked is]
an occupational hazard .... I saw him go into court and walk
away [a free man]. After a while, I gave up on the ... criminal
justice system."'13 Recently, Cohan's stalker was apprehended
after he was found searching for her in a federal courthouse with
a large knife. 14 Cohan is pleased with the creation of stalking
legislation and wishes it had been in place when her stalker first
targeted her twenty years ago.15
In contrast, Maryann Michalski is not satisfied with the stalking
law in her state of Illinois and feels that the court system has
failed her.16 The Chicago woman fled from a courtroom in June
1993 after her former boyfriend was sentenced to probation on
an aggravated stalking charge. In tears, she exclaimed, "He's
going to kill me. He's going to kill me." 17 The judge indicated
that he could not incarcerate the stalker because the former
couple had maintained a friendship after their live-in relationship
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
10. Lisa Brennan, Prosecutor Gratefiulfor Stalking Legislation, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
June 25, 1993, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (second alteration in original).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Accused Stalker Gets Probation, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 1993, at 5.
17. Id.
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ended. 18 For many judges, the existence of an amicable relation-
ship casts doubt on the reasonableness of the stalking victim's
fear. 9
Recently, the highly publicized account of Swarthmore College
student Alexis Clinansmith's claim that she was being stalked
by fellow student Ewart Yearwood created more questions re-
garding what behavioral patterns constitute stalking.20 According
to Clinansmith, Yearwood appeared wherever Clinansmith went,
entered her room without her permission, and stood outside her
dormitory for hours.21 Swarthmore President Alfred H. Bloom
determined that Yearwood had not "harassed" Clinansmith, but
rather he had displayed a "pattern of intimidation."2 Bloom
directed Yearwood to leave school for a year, but Swarthmore
agreed to pay Yearwood's tuition at another institution.P In
December 1993 Clinansmith asked the Delaware County District
Attorney to consider bringing charges against Yearwood, but
Clinansmith later decided not to pursue the matter and no charges
were filed.U The difficulties Clinansmith had in showing she had
been stalked are indicative of the lack of consensus of what
constitutes stalking.
II. WHY IS STALKING AN URGENT ISSUE?
The foregoing examples represent only three of the thousands
of stalking cases nationwide. In 1993 it was estimated that there
were as many as 200,000 stalkers in the United States.2 Such
evidence points to the need for effective stalking laws. Successful
stalking laws could save countless lives: approximately ninety
percent of all women killed by their husbands or boyfriends were
stalked by them prior to the fatal attack.2 6
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
20. Mary Jordan, Case of He Said, She Said Embroils Swarthmore in 'Sexual Politics,'
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1994, at A3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Marie McCullough, Swarthmore Freshman Won't Face Stalking Charge in a Case
That Got National Attention: The Student Who Sought Charges Said She Wants to Drop
the Case, PHnA. INQUERER, Mar. 2, 1994, at MD1.
25. Antistalking Proposals: Hearing on Combating [sic] Stalking and Family Violence
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993) (statement of
Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman).
26. Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. William S. Cohen).
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Although the need for stalking laws is great, creating effective
legislation is not an easy task due to the special nature of stalking.
As many as seventy-five to eighty percent of all stalking cases
involve people who were once married or dating.2 One concern
is that judges and police do not take seriously what they regard
as a family matter.2 Another complication is that, as with other
crimes involving husbands and boyfriends, women often decline
to report attacks in stalking situations.P A recent survey indi-
cated that eighteen percent of all women attacked by their
husbands or boyfriends did not report the attack to the police,
compared with three percent of victims attacked by strangers.30
Finally, a judge may have difficulty "in discerning a credible
threat from a casual remark."3' Northwestern University Law
Professor Ronald Allen provides one example of this difficulty: a
husband who says "Remember New Jersey?" may seem harmless
to a judge, but the wife may know that the husband is referring
to an incident in New Jersey during which he beat her severely.32
This difficulty is a particularly large obstacle to overcome. The
goal of stalking laws "is to personalize threats," but what con-
stitutes a threat "cannot possibly be captured by a rule."33
Another difficulty in drafting stalking legislation relates to
those stalking situations between strangers or acquaintances, as
well as situations involving people who were once married or
dating. Stalking laws, to be effective, must be invoked at an
earlier stage than other criminal laws.34 Legislative attorney
Kenneth Thomas argues that stalking laws create "a tension
between what criminal law traditionally has done-punish past
behavior-and using criminal law in a more preventative way." 35
The traditional method for dealing with this crime, civil protec-
tion orders, simply does not provide enough protection against
27. Michele Ingrassia, Stalked to Death?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 1993, at 28.
28. Jones, supra note 2, at 178.
29. Most Female Crime Victinm Knew Attackers Study Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
1994, at A5.
30. Id.
31. See Ingrassia, supra note 27, at 28.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Professor Ronald Allen of Northwestern University).
34. See Strikis, supra note 4, at 2777, 2779 (proposing that stalking laws bring offenders
into the judicial system before the escalation to physical harm that most criminal statutes
prohibit).
35. Ren6e Cordes, Watching Over the Watched: Greater Protection Sought for Stalking
Victim, TRIAL, Oct. 1993, at 12, 13.
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stalkers.36 One reason is the widespread lack of enforcement.37 A
national study found that when violators of civil protection orders
flee before the police arrive, the officers typically do not pursue
the offender or obtain an arrest warrant. Additionally, the reach
of legislation providing for the use of protection orders is often
limited to certain types of abuse, certain persons, and certain
forms of relief.39
Despite the many difficulties involved in crafting a stalking
law, a rising death toll and growing public outcry forced states
to act. In 1990, following the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer
by a stalker, California passed the nation's first stalking law. 0
California's action was a positive step, both symbolically and
tactically. Symbolically, anti-stalking legislation provides the vic-
tim with the advantage of a criminal complaint; it promotes
recognition of the seriousness of stalking. 1 The legislation also
sends a message that violence against women will not be toler-
ated;12 this message is especially important considering that,
historically, society has accepted wifebeating. 43 Tactically, stalk-
ing laws enable police officers to stop the violence before it
escalates by breaking the typical chain of misdemeanor prose-
cutions which does nothing to stop the ultimate threat to a
victim's safety.44
III. STATE STALKING LAWS
A. California Responds: The Nation's First Stalking Law
California's stalking law defines a stalker as one who "willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person
36. Strikis, supra note 4, at 2776 (citing Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection
Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement, in ISSUES AND PRACTICES
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2-3 (National Inst. of Justice ed., 1990)).
37. Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court
Practice, and Enforcement, in ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2-3 (National
Inst. of Justice ed., 1990).
38. Id.
39. Woods, supra note 5, at 451. For an in-depth discussion of the way civil protection
orders operate in harassment cases, see id. at 452-56.
40. Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46
VAND. L. REV. 991, 992 (1993); see statute infra note 45.
41. Strikis, supra note 4, at 2777.
42. Id. at 2777-82.
43. JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 73 (1994).
44. Salame, supra note 3, at 98-99.
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and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of
his or her immediate family."4
45. CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994). The statute reads in full:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses
another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place
that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or
her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1000), or by both that fine and imprison-
ment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting
the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.
(c) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this section,
commits a second or subsequent violation of this section shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.
(d) For purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys,
torments, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose.
The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the person. "Course of conduct" means a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not
included within the meaning of "course of conduct."
(e) For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination
of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety
of his or her immediate family.
(f) This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor picketing.
(g) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence is
suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a condition
of probation that the person participate in counseling, as designated by the
court. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may find that the
counseling requirement shall not be imposed.
(h) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the defendant
from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years, as
determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length
of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before
the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim
and his or her immediate family. The duration of the restraining order may
be longer than five years only in an extreme case, where a longer duration
is necessary to protect the safety of the victim or his or her immediate
family.
(i) For purposes of this section, "immediate family" means any spouse, parent,
child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second
degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who.
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The California statute, like most state statutes that followed
it, has two main components: a threat requirement and an intent
requirement. The threat requirement in California's stalking law
is that of a "credible threat," which is a threat made with the
intent and apparent ability to carry out that threat. 6 These
elements are found in the language of the statute.47 The apparent
ability element is supported by the phrase "reasonably fear for
... her safety or the safety of ... her immediate family." 48 That
is, it would not be reasonable to fear harm from a person who
was physically incapable of doing harm.
The California statute also requires the victim's fear resulting
from the threat to meet objective and subjective standards. The
stalker's conduct must "cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substan-
tial emotional distress to the person." 49 California's intent require-
ment provides that the stalker must both intend to cause and
actually cause reasonable fear on the part of hiss° victim.5' It
would not be enough that the offender wanted to frighten his
victim if she were not actually afraid. Conversely, even if an
offender's actions did frighten a victim, the offender would not
be liable under the California stalking statute if he did not intend
to frighten the victim.
within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.
(j) The court shall consider whether the defendant would benefit from
treatment pursuant to Section 2684. If it is determined to be appropriate,
the court shall recommend that the Department of Corrections make a
certification as provided in Section 2684. Upon the certification, the defendant
shall be evaluated and transferred to the appropriate hospital for treatment
pursuant to Section 2684.
Id. S 646.9.
46. Id. S 646.9(e); NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra.. note 4, at 22.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(e).
48. Id. This is not the original California stalking statute, but rather the statute as
amended in 1993. The original statute, enacted in 1990, prohibited only placing the victim
in fear of her own life or body, but not the lives or bodies of her immediate family. CAL.
PENAL CODE S 646.9(a) (1990) (amended 1993). The 1993 version is more inclusive, defining
"immediate family" to include not only spouses, children, and other conventional family
members, but also any "person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within
the prior six months, regularly resided in the household." CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(i)
(1993).
49. Id. S 646.9(d).
50. Stalkers are overwhelmingly male, Susan E. Bernstein, Note, Living Under Seige:
Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims? 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 528 & n.18(1993), and this Comment will use the masculine pronoun to refer to stalkers. Similarly,
this Comment will use the feminine pronoun to refer to stalking victims, as women
represent the majority of stalking victims. Strikis, supra note 4, at 2771 & n.16.
51. Id. S 646.9(e).
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Like many stalking statutes, California's statute specifically
prohibits "fllowing" and "harassing" in addition to what it de-
fines generally as stalking. 2 Harassment is defined as a "knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which
seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person and
which serves no legitimate purpose." 3
Finally, California provides for two levels of punishment for
the crime of stalking-misdemeanor and feloiy.1 If convicted of
violating the statute, a stalker can be sentenced to a maximum
of one year in jail and fined up to one thousand dollars.55 If the
violation occurs while a restraining order, injunction, or other
court order related to the stalking charge is already in place in
connection with the same party, the crime is a felony and the
punishment is imprisonment in a state prison for two, three, or
four years. 56 Any stalking violation that follows a prior felony
stalking conviction is a felony punishable by two, three, or four
years in prison. 57
The first of its kind, California's stalking law served as a call
to arms for many state legislatures. Victims' advocates and law
enforcement officers applauded California's efforts.', The legis-
lative history of the statute indicates that it was implemented
primarily to help victims of domestic violence, providing them
with stronger weapons than the civil protection orders upon
which they were once forced to rely. 9 Such protection is vital
because, as domestic violence experts agree, men who batter will
go to extremes unless someone intervenes ° With tough stalking
laws, that "someone" can now be the criminal justice system.
Additionally, the classification of stalking as a felony rather than
a misdemeanor sends a message that the concerns of stalking
victims are being taken seriously. 6' The stiffer penalties associ-
ated with the felony classification incapacitate the stalker and
provide the victim with at least a temporary reprieve from the
terror she faces daily.62 Because a stalker who receives probation
52. Id. S 646.9(a).
53. Id. S 646.9(d).
54. Id S 646.9(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. 5 646.9(b).
57. Id. S 646.9(c).
58. Bernstein, supra note 50, at 544-45.
59. Id. at 545.
60. Id. at 557-59.
61. See Strikis, supra note 4, at 2777-78.
62. See id. at 2778-79, 2781.
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or a slight sentence will quickly regain access to the victim, "the
goal of maximum protection for stalking victims dictates the need
for rigorous sentencing and criminal penalties."63
Not everyone is satisfied with the California stalking law. Some
commentators are concerned with possible constitutional prob-
lems. One potential challenge is "void-for-vagueness."64 To survive
a void-for-vagueness challenge, a penal statute must "define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."65
Because the California statute defines stalking in accordance with
this standard, it would probably survive any such challenge.66
Although the term "credible threat" may seem ambiguous, the
statute requires "the intent and the apparent ability to carry out
the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the
threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of
his or her immediate family."67 Intent has been construed to mean
that the stalker "need only have the apparent ability to carry
out the threat and the intent to cause the victim to fear."' 8
Additionally, the term "course of conduct" is defined specifically,
and would likely be upheld69
Another possible challenge to the California statute could be
based on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution;
it could be argued that calling, writing, and following are pro-
tected expressive conduct. 70 First, "harassing conduct such as
threats required under antistalking statutes would probably not
rise to the level of protected speech."'71 The California statute
also contains specific provisions that would enable it to survive
63. Salame, supra note 3, at 91.
64. Guy, supra note 40, at 1012-13.
65. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding a California statute to be
unconstitutionally vague for insufficiently clarifying the term "credible and reliable"
identification).
66. Guy, supra note 40, at 1014-16.
67. CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(e); see Guy, supra note 40, at 1014-15.
68. Guy, supra note 40, at 1014. The alternative construction is that "the stalker must
have the intent to carry out the threat." Id. Under this alternative construction, the
stalking statute would have no advantage over traditional statutes, as both would require
the stalker to undertake the commission of the threat before incurring criminal liability.
Id
69. Id. at 1015-16; see Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1987).
70. U.S. CONST. amend I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ...." ; see Strikis, supra note 4, at 2784.
71. Strikis, supra note 4, at 2785 (relying on R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992), and Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)).
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this challenge. For instance, the statute specifically exempts labor
picketing from its provisions 2 Additionally, the statute evinces
a clear intent to remove constitutionally protected activity from
its scope with the blanket statement, "[c]onstitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of con-
duct."'7 3 Activities not specifically mentioned, such as newspaper
or television reporting, would not fall under the statute even
without the blanket statement. The statute's definition of "ha-
rass" describes a willful course of conduct "which seriously alarms,
annoys, torments, or terrorizes [a victim], and which serves no
legitimate purpose."7 4 Reporting and similar activities have legit-
imate purposes. Finally, if the statute does not impact adversely
on First Amendment freedoms, a challenge of facial vagueness
would likely succeed only if the statute were overly vague in all
possible applications 5
Constitutional issues aside, questions still remain regarding the
effectiveness of the California stalking statute. John Lane, head
of the innovative Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Threat
Management Unit, indicated that the primary difficulty police
face in apprehending stalkers is the "credible threat" require-
ment7 "Many suspects don't overtly threaten [victims] even
though their behavior is terrorizing," Lane explained. 77 Deputy
District Attorney Rhonda Sanders expressed a similar concern,
maintaining that the law is often an "inadequate defense against
former lovers and husbands with a propensity for violence. Their
behavior may look ambiguous or even innocent to a judge or a
police officer, but can be clearly threatening to the victim." 78 For
this reason, the standard that is used to determine the reasonable
fear component of the threat requirement may be inappropriate
for victims of domestic violence 7 9 Although some modifications
may be needed, such as changing the "credible threat" language,
the California legislature should be commended for being the
first to establish the crime of stalking. California's statute has
served as a model and a starting point for the rest of the nation.
72. CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(f).
73. Id. S 646.9(d).
74. Id.
75. Strikis, supra note 4, at 2785.
76. Cordes, supra note 35, at 13.
77. Id.
78. Nina Schuyler, No Place to Hide, CAL. LAW., June 1993, at 18, 20; see supra notes
31-33 and accompanying text.
79. Bernstein, supra note 60, at 549.
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B. Other States Follow Suit
Other states quickly followed the California legislature and by
early 1994 almost every state in the nation had a criminal stalking
lawP With so many states enacting their own legislation, the
laws have many substantive differences as well as subtle varia-
tions.81 Nonetheless, a few major trends have emerged in threat
and intent requirements.8 2
1. Threat Requirements
The most easily fulfilled threat requirement is one that calls
for either threat or conduct, as exemplified by the Virginia
stalking statute.83 Finding such a threat requirement to "prohibit
actions that would cause a reasonable person to feel threatened,"
and finding that an explicit threat "is not required to satisfy an
element of the crime," the National Institute of Justice notes
that more than twenty-five states have this type of threat re-
80. For some time Maine and Arizona were the only states without laws specifically
addressing stalking. Maine recently developed a statute recognizing the crime of stalking.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 506-A (West 1964 & Supp. 1993). Arizona still relies on
its terrorism statute to deal with the problem. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 13-2308.01 (1989).
81. See infra notes 83-137 and accompanying text.
82. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-27.
83. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1994). The statute reads in full:
A. Any person who on more than one occasion engages in conduct directed
at another person with the intent to place, or with the knowledge that the
conduct places, that other person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual
assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to that other person's spouse
or child shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.
B. However, any person who is convicted of a first offense in violation of
subsection A when, at the time of the offense, there was in effect any order
prohibiting contact between the defendant and the victim or the victim's
spouse or child, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
C. A second conviction occurring within five years of a first conviction for
an offense under this section or for a similar offense under the law of any
other jurisdiction shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor. A third or subsequent
conviction occurring within five years of a conviction for an offense under
this section or for a similar offense under the law of any other jurisdiction
shall be a Class 6 felony.
D. A person may be convicted under this section irrespective of the juris-
diction or jurisdictions within the Commonwealth wherein the conduct de-
scribed in subsection A occurred, if the person engaged in that conduct on
at least one occasion in the jurisdiction where the person is tried.
E. Upon finding a person guilty under this section, the court shall, in addition
to the sentence imposed, issue an order prohibiting contact between the
defendant and the victim or the victim's spouse or child.
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quirement. 84 This threat requirement helps to alleviate the prob-
lem cited by John Lane of the LAPD regarding the difficulty
police officers face in enforcing California's law because of its
"credible threat" standard.8 s Because no explicit threat is re-
quired, the lack of an overt threat that troubles Lane would not
necessarily be problematic under Virginia's stalking law.
New Jersey uses another type of threat requirement, the
threat or conduct standard, but with the additional requirement
of intent and apparent ability. 8 No other state stalking statutes
employ this combination of mandatory factors to meet its threat
requirement.87 Pursuant to the New Jersey statute, if, at the
time of the threat, a stalker does not look strong or well-armed
enough to carry out his threat, then he would not be guilty of
stalking8s New Jersey's "intent and apparent ability" language,
however, may not be necessary to accomplish this result. Both
the Virginia and the New Jersey statutes contain intent provi-
84. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. SS 11.41.260,
.270 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 53a-181c, d (Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S
121B (Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 2709 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
S§ 1061-1063 (Supp. 1994).
85. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
86. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. S 2C:12-10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). The statute reads in
pertinent part:
a. As used in this act:
(1) "Course of conduct" means a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person, composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose which alarms
or annoys that person and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course
of conduct must be such as to cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional
distress. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the
meaning of "course of conduct."
(2) "Credible threat" means an explicit or implicit threat made with the
intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat, so as to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for that person's
safety.
b. A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposely
and repeatedly follows another person and engages in a course of conduct
or makes a credible threat with the intent of annoying or placing that person
in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.
c. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime
of stalking in -violation of an existing court order prohibiting the behavior.
d. A person who commits a second or subsequent offense of stalking which
involves an act of violence or a credible threat of violence against the same
victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
e. This act shall not apply to conduct which occurs during organized group
picketing.
Id.
87. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24.
88. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. S 2C:12-10(aX2).
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sions elsewhere, and although Virginia does not use the phrase
"apparent ability," it does require that the victim's fear be
reasonable. 9 Arguably, if the perpetrator does not appear to
have the ability to carry out his threat, any fear on the part of
the victim would be unreasonable.90
A third type of threat requirement calls for a threat and
conduct, but does not include the intent and apparent ability
language. Fewer than ten states use this type of threat stan-
dard.P Because both a threat and conduct are required, and
because some of these states also employ a reasonable person
standard regarding the victim's fear,92 domestic violence victims
are inadequately protected by this type of stalking statute. An
ex-husband, for example, may know his former wife very well
and may be able to engage in an act which he knows will terrify
89. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-60.3(A).
90. See Carter v. State, 758 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a threat
and the apparent ability to carry out the threat create reasonable fear).
91. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, S
43 (1958 & Supp. 1994). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person and who makes a threat with the intent to place that person in
imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury shall be guilty of the crime
of stalking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
not more than five years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars,
or imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-
half years or both.
(b) Whoever commits the crime of stalking in violation of a temporary or
permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or judgment issued pur-
suant to sections eighteen, thirty-four B. or thirty-four C of chapter two
hundred and eight; or section thirty-two of chapter two hundred and nine;
or sections three, four, or five of chapter two hundred and nine A; or sections
fifteen or twenty of chapter two hundred and nine C; or a temporary
restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction issued by the
superior court, shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail or the state
prison for not less than one year and not more than five years. No sentence
imposed under the provisions of this subsection shall be less than a man-
datory minimum term of imprisonment of one year....
(c) Whoever, after having been convicted of the crime of stalking, commits
a second or subsequent such crime shall be punished by imprisonment in a
jail or the state prison for not less than two years and not more than ten
years. No sentence imposed under the provisions of this subsection shall be
less than a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years ....
(d) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful
pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a
specific person, which seriously alarms or annoys the person. Said conduct
must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress.
Id.
92. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, S 43(d).
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her, which she will recognize as a threat, and which the ex-
husband intends to be a threat, but which no judge would
recognize as a threat.93 Without an explicit threat in addition to
his conduct, this man would remain on the streets, free to stalk
his former spouse. Thus, although the threat and conduct require-
ment may be less likely than other threat requirements to fall
under constitutional challenges, it will leave unpunished stalkers
that the Virginia and even the New Jersey statutes would rec-
ognize.94
Finally, the last type of threat requirement is that of both
threat and conduct and intent and apparent ability. This require-
ment is found in the California statute. s Only five other states
use this strict standard.96 As discussed, this standard may be
constitutionally strong, but it does not satisfy many victims and
legal officers.9 One California victim, Terry, was terrorized for
years by her ex-husband, who would call her as much as one
hundred times a night, follow her and her friends, and sit outside
her night school classes in his car.9 8 Because the ex-husband did
not explicitly voice a threat, he could not be charged under the
California stalking law. After two years of following and calling
Terry, Terry's ex-husband finally attacked her with a knife.99
Under a law with a less stringent and detailed threat require-
ment, perhaps Terry's ex-husband could have been charged before
his violent attack on her life. 100
2. Intent Requirements
The effectiveness of a given type of threat requirement de-
pends in part on its counterpart, the intent requirement.101 The
93. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text; see also Bernstein, supra note 50,
at 562-63 (explaining that stalkers may know the law and attempt to circumvent it).
94. See statutes supra notes 83, 86.
95. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
96. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-24. See ALA. CODE S 13A-6-90 to -94
(1975); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 1173 (West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-
59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); WIs. STAT.
ANN. S 947.013 (West 1993).
97. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
98. Schuyler, upra note 78, at 18.
99. Id.
100. For example, under Virginia's stalking statute, which does not require an explicit
threat, Terry's ex-husband could have been charged with stalking if he made multiple
telephone calls or followed her with the intent to frighten her or with the knowledge
that his actions would cause her reasonable fear. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
101. In some statutes, the concepts of threat and intent are intertwined. For example,
ANTI-STALKING DEVELOPMENTS
intent requirement is the second major component of stalking
laws. States approach the intent requirement in three different
ways.102 The first approach requires that the stalker intend to
cause as well as actually cause reasonable fear, and is exemplified
by the California stalking statute.10 3 As previously discussed, the
reasonable fear portion of this requirement may do a substantial
disservice to domestic violence victims. 0 4 It does, however, pro-
tect innocent people from being charged with stalking by acting
"as a threshold to ensure the serious intent is indeed present."'05
A second approach to the intent requirement provides that the
stalker must intend to cause and actually cause alarm or annoy-
ance.10 6 The New Jersey stalking statute is an example of this
form of intent.1°7 In order to be held liable under this language,
one need not even intend to frighten one's victim, but merely to
annoy her. The New Jersey statute's definition of "credible
threat," however, mandates that the stalking victim fear for his
or her safety."0 " Behavior that is no more than annoying, there-
fore, is not actually illegal under the New Jersey stalking statute.
The third and final approach to intent is the complete absence
of an intent requirement. 1°9 This approach mandates that the
stalker's actions actually cause reasonable fear."0 This provision
Virginia's threat requirement can include an examination of the stalker's intent. See supra
notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
102. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 25-27.
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(a), (e) (West Supp. 1994).
104. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
105. Guy, supra note 40, at 1002.
106. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra, note 4, at 25-27.
107. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. S 2C:12-10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
108. Id. S (a2).
109. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 25-27.
110. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 200.575 (Michie 1993). The statute reads in
pertinent part:
1. A person who, without lawful authority, willfully or maliciously engages
in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated or harassed, and that actually causes the victim to
feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed, commits the crime of
stalking....
5. As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct which consists of a
series of acts over time that evidences a continuity of purpose directed
at a specific person.
(b) "Without lawful authority" includes acts which are initiated or continued
without the victim's consent. The term does not include acts which are
otherwise protected or authorized by constitutional or statutory law,
regulation or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, including, but not
1994]
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would allow prosecution of an erotomaniac, who wilfully performs
certain frightening acts but has the notion that his actions are
desired by the victim, or at least are not frightening to the
victim. 1 ' This scenario might be comforting to victims, but it
would probably alarm civil libertarians and others with concerns
for the mentally ill.112
S. Proscribed Acts
In addition to generally defining stalking, many states specif-
ically prohibit certain activities by name. Some states expressly
list only one or two prohibited acts, whereas others offer a whole
litany of forbidden behavior." 3 For example, although the New
Jersey stalking statute specifically proscribes only pursuing or
following, Michigan's stalking statute proscribes "appearing within
the sight of the individual," approaching, confronting, contacting,
or harassing her."4 Other acts that have been specifically pro-
limited to:
(1) Picketing which occurs during a strike, work stoppage or any other
labor dispute.
(2) The activities of a reporter, photographer, cameraman or other person
while gathering information for communication to the public if that
person is employed or engaged by or has contracted with a newspaper,
periodical, press association or radio or television station and is acting
solely within that professional capacity.
(3) The activities of any person that are carried out in the normal course
of his lawful employment.
(4) Any activities carried out in the exercise of the constitutionally
protected rights of freedom of speech and assembly.
Id.
111. See Woods, supra note 5, at 450.
112. Id. at 46647.
113. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-20.
114. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. j 2C:1210; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. SS 600.2950(a), 600.2954,
750.411(h4i), 764.15(b), 771.2, 771.2(a) (West 1994). The Michigan stalking statute reads, in
pertinent part:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series
of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of
purpose.
(b) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that
may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treat-
ment or counseling.
(c) "Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that includes,
but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that
would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, and that
actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does
not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves" a
legitimate purpose.
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scribed in various states include approaching,115 surveillance,18
lying in wait,117 and intimidation.118 Although listing certain acts
as "illegal" adds clarity to a statute, doing so is problematic
because of the possibility that such a list might be regarded as
exclusive. 19 Three states, Nevada, Ohio, and Wisconsin, do not
specifically name any type of behavior as prohibited.1 20
4. Unique Provisions
In addition to the basic framework of threat and intent re-
quirements, a number of states have included some innovative
(d) "Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or
continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable
person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(e)'Unconsented contact" means any contact with another individual that
is initiated or continued without that individual's consent, or in disregard
of that individual's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or dis-
continued. Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the
following:
(i) Following or appearing within the sight of the individual.
(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on
private property.
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual.
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied
by that individual.
(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased, or occupied by that individual ....
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.411h.
115. ALASKA STAT. S 11.41.270(bX3XB) (Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 5 121B(aX3)
(Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.411h(1)(e)(ii) (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, S 1173 (West Supp. 1994).
116. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. S 16-5-90(a) (Supp. 1994).
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. S 53a-181d(a) (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, S 1061(a) (Supp.
1994).
118. GA. CODE ANN. S 16-5-90(a) (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 45-5-220(1)(b) (1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 633:3-al(c) (Supp. 1993); NJ). CENT. CODE S 12.1-17-07.1.1.b. (Supp.
1993).
119. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 44. Case law reveals conflicting views on
the issue of the exclusivity of statutory lists. See Langlois v. Noble, 465 So. 2d 108 (La.
1985) (finding a statutory list of classes of persons authorized to claim damages arising
out of the death of another person to be exclusive and not merely illustrative); see also
Burdine & Assocs. v. Noel, 650 So. 2d 677 (La. 1989) (finding that a statutory list
categorizing actions that may be instituted by summary process to be exclusive, not
illustrative). Contra Hall v. Hall, 589 N.E.2d 553 (II. 1991) (finding that a statutory list
of child custody factors is not exclusive).
120. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 200.575 (Michie 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. S 2903.211
(Baldwin 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. S 947.013 (West Supp. 1993); see NIJ RESEARCH REPORT,
supra note 4, at 16-20.
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special provisions in their stalking statutes. For example, some
state statutes require special training for law enforcement, pro-
secutors, and the judiciary. 121 This requirement is an important
addition in light of the problems police officers have faced with
stalking laws.122 Furthermore, given allegations that the legal
system does not take stalking victims seriously, special training
could improve judicial response to victims' fears. 2 3
For instance, some believe that prosecutors, judges, and juries
require a higher standard of corroboration in domestic violence
incidents than in cases involving strangers. 2 4 In the case of Terry,
the California woman stalked by her ex-husband, her attorney
"had her describe to the judge the terror of being stalked. [Terry]
says that her husband's light sentence shows that the judge was
unimpressed with her description."'25 Terry's ex-husband received
five years probation. 126
Wyoming's stalking law includes a requirement that law en-
forcement provide emergency assistance to victims.'2 A Massa-
chusetts study found that assistance provisions have a great
influence. 28 The Massachusetts study found that seventy-one
percent of women who obtained temporary restraining orders in
one particular district court in 1982 did not appear at a hearing
ten days later.2 In contrast, in a different district that had a
separate office for restraining orders, daily briefing sessions for
women seeking restraining orders, and support groups run by
the prosecutor's office, approximately three percent of the women
failed to appear for the hearing.12 Thus, "given a little help to
negotiate a complicated and hostile system beset with obstacles,
women follow through."131
Some states require electronic monitoring of a convicted stalker
as a condition of pretrial release or probatioii. 32 Colorado is
121. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
122. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
123. Ingrassia, supra note 27, at 28.
124. Salame, supra note 3, at 99. Salame maintains that the difficulties that the legal
system has in addressing the concerns of stalking victims are compounded by an inherent
gender bias which battered women face from participants in the judicial process. Id.
125. Schuyler, supra note 78, at 20.
126. Id
127. WYo. STAT. ANN. SS 1-1-126, 6-2-505, 7-3-506 to -511 (Michie 1994), NIJ RESEARCH
REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
128. Jones, supra note 2, at 179.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
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experimenting with a system that requires known offenders to
wear an electronic ankle bracelet which sets off an alarm if the
stalker gets near his victim.1" In Massachusetts, the state's
domestic violence program includes court confiscation of weapons
from alleged abusers, and requires that victims of crime be
informed that they have the option to file criminal complaints as
well as restraining orders.'3' Massachusetts also has a computer
system to track assailants who violate protective orders.135 These
and other special provisions are tools that can be of great help
to victims, prosecutors, judges, and police officers. 1w
V. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE MODEL ANTI-STALKING
CODE FOR STATES'"
The National Institute of Justice Model Anti-Stalking Code for
States (Model Stalking Code) is a fairly simple stalking statute
designed for states to use, adapt, or supplement as they see fit.as
It reads:
Section 1. For purposes of this code:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a
visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly convey-
ing verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or
a combination thereof directed at or toward a person;
133. Woods, supra note 5, at 471; Technology Takes Aim at Stalkers, Cm. TRIB., Sept.
20, 1992, at 4.
134. Id.
135. Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws Proliferate, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 35, 36; see
Lardner, supra note 1, at C3; see also George Lardner, The Stalking of Kristin, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at Cl (describing the stalking and murder of the author's daughter).
The murder of the author's daughter at the hands of her ex-boyfriend-turned-stalker
received a great deal of attention and sparked the enactment of a new law in Massachu-
setts. Lardner, supra note 1, at C3. Kristin had filed numerous complaints against her
ex-boyfriend and had obtained restraining orders in order to keep him away from her.
At two hearings regarding the restraining orders the judges did not examine the stalker's
lengthy and violent criminal record. Id. At the time of Kristin's murder, there were
multiple outstanding complaints against her killer. Id. The computerized registry of
protective order violators allows Massachusetts to "put] resources rather than rhetoric
behind its pledge to fight stalking." Kolarik, supra, at 36 (quoting Professor Jonathan
Turley of George Washington University National Law Center).
136. See supra notes 28-32, 121-31 and accompanying text.
137. (National Inst. of Justice 1993) available in NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4,
at 43-48 [hereinafter MODEL STALKING CODE]. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is
the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. "NIJ was
established to prevent and reduce crime and to improve the criminal justice system."
NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at inside cover.
138. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
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(b) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions;
(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling,
or any other person who regularly resides in the household or
who within the prior six months regularly resided in the
household.
Section 2. Any person who:
(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear
bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her
immediate family or to fear the death of himself or herself or
a member of his or her immediate family; and
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific
person will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to
himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family
or will be placed in reasonable fear of the death of himself or.
herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and
(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily
injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate
family or induce fear in the specific person of the death of
himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family;
is guilty of stalking.139
Like the existing state statutes, the Model Stalking Code is
based on requirements of threat and intent. It does not employ
the "credible threat" language used by states such as California 140
because the drafters wanted to reach implied threats as well as
overt threats.1 4' The commentary to the Model Stalking Code
indicates that, "Isltalking defendants often will not threaten their
victims verbally or in writing but will instead engage in conduct
which, taken in context, would cause a reasonable person fear."' 42
In allowing for implied threats' 43 and using the term "in con-
text,"1 44 the Model Stalking Code may create the most effective
threat requirement available to victims. Although the model
statute contains both subjective 45 and objective 46 reasonableness
requirements, it seems to allow for an interpretation that would
permit the trier of fact to consider whether the victim's fear was
139. MODEL STALKING CODE SS 1-2.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994); see supra notes 46.48 and accom-
panying text.
141. NIJ RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
142. MODEL STALKING CODE commentary at 45 (Credible Threat).
143. Id. S 1(a).
144. Id. commentary at 45 (Credible Threat).
145. Id. S 2(c).
146. Id. S 2(a).
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reasonable under the victim's particular circumstances and will
be particularly useful to domestic violence victims. 147 Because
domestic violence victims make up a large percentage of stalking
targets, 1 8 states should seriously consider adopting a threat
requirement similar to that of the Model Stalking Code.
The Model Stalking Code requires that the conduct be "pur-
poseful"' 14 9 and that the stalker "has knowledge or should have
knowledge" that the victim will be fearful as a result of the
stalker's conduct.O This standard is quite different from existing
stalking statutes that hinge on "intent" and/or "actually cause"
language in their intent requirements.16 1 The language in the
Model Stalking Code is more clear. Although "intent" can be
interpreted in many ways, the Model Stalking Code's language,
"has knowledge or should have knowledge,"5 2 is fairly straight-
forward and not open to varying interpretation. Determining
whether a person should have known something seems much
simpler, based on a given set of facts, than proving that a person
intended to cause a specific result or reaction. Determining
whether a given course of conduct was purposeful is similarly
straightforward, for one need only ask whether a person behaved
a certain way on purpose, as opposed to accidentally.
Other aspects of the Model Stalking Code that represent sig-
nificant departures from ,many state stalking statutes include the
suggestion in the commentary that stalking should be made a
felony and the absence of a list of prohibited acts.'13 Omitting a
list of specifically prohibited acts is probably a wise idea because,
as the Model Stalking Law's drafters noted, "some courts have
ruled that if a state includes a specific list, that list is exclu-
sive. '" The drafters' suggestion that states treat stalking as a
felony is indicative of how threatening they believed stalking to
be."'55 The commentary to the Model Stalking Code suggests that,
for less egregious acts, states could use their existing harassment
147. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
148. Woods, supra note 5, at 450.
149. MODEL STALKING CODE S 2(a).
150. Id. S 2(b).
151. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE S 646.9; N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. S 2C:12-10 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1994).
152. MODEL STALKING CODE S 2(b).
153. Id. commentary at 46 (Classification as a Felony).
154. Id. at 44 (Prohibited Acts); see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
155. MODEL STALKING CODE commentary at 46 (Classification as a Felony).
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or intimidation statutes.' Maryland Delegate Chris Van Hollen,
Jr., who is disappointed that his state's stalking statute permits
only a misdemeanor classification of stalking, believes that the
creation of a felony classification signals the gravity of a crime.157
Van Hollen asserted that making stalking a felony rather than a
misdemeanor is important because one does not want to put
stalking on the same level as jaywalking.11 Due to prison over-
crowding and other pressures, many states may be reluctant to
heed this advice l9 One solution would be to provide for a stalking
misdemeanor for non-violent first time offenders against whom
no restraining order is in place. The emphasis would then be
placed on a statute's felony stalking provision, which could be
used to varying degrees in other situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the passage of time and the development of more case
law in the area of stalking, it will be easier to more effectively
evaluate existing stalking laws and to determine what changes
should be made.'® For now, states should compare their stalking
statutes with the National Institute of Justice Model Stalking
Code. States with problematic "threat" language should consider
adopting Virginia's "threat or conduct" language and abandoning
the "credible threat" language, as the Model Stalking Code sug-
gests. 61 For all states, the Model Stalking Code's use of the
156. Id. For a good example, see the Maine harassment statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, S 506-A (West 1964 & Supp. 1993), which was used for some time in Maine as
a substitute for a stalking law. The Maine harassment statute reads in pertinent part:
"1. A person is guilty of harassment if, without reasonable cause, he engages in any
course of conduct with the intent to harass, torment, or threaten another person, after
having been forbidden to do so by any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer or
notary public." Id.
157. Telephone interview with Chris Van Hollen, Jr., Maryland Delegate (Mar. 17,
1994).
158. Id.
159. See Mark Silva, Prison Overcrowding Forces Early Release of Inmates, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 31, 1993, at 4M.
160. At this time, a relatively small amount of case law exists in the area of stalking.
The case law that does exist largely involves void-for-vagueness challenges. In August
1994 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found the Massachusetts stalking law, MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 265, S 43 (1958 & Supp. 1994), to be unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543 (1994). Section 43(d), defining "harass,"
was held to be unconstitutionally vague because it could have been interpreted as
requiring repeatedly harassing a victim through more than one pattern of conduct, when
in fact only one pattern of conduct need be established. Id. The court held that, in the
future, the definition was to be interpreted as not requiring repeated conduct. Id.
161. MODEL STALKING CODE commentary at 45 (Credible Threat).
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"knows or should know" standard, accompanied by a requirement
of purposeful conduct, is worth considering when developing an
intent standard. This approach or a variant thereof may prove
helpful in removing the difficulties surrounding the word "in-
tent."162
Finally, all states should consider adding special provisions
which states such as Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey
have created: educational requirements for law enforcement of-
ficers and the judiciary on stalking and gender issues and victim
assistance and notification programs.16 Provisions such as these
could save lives. Because ninety percent of all women who are
killed by their husbands or boyfriends are stalked prior to their
deaths,164 it is clear that with an effective stalking law, the
criminal justice system would have a chance to prevent many
needless deaths.165 Until recently, this opportunity and countless
lives were wasted.
With the development of stalking laws across the nation and
the guidance of the Model Stalking Law, progress can be made.
The criminal justice system can work to better protect the many
lives that are endangered as a result of stalking each year-all
200,000 of them.
162. See supra part IIIB.2.
163. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
164. Antistalking Proposals: Hearing on Combating [sic] Stalking and Family Violence
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993) (statement of
Sen. William S. Cohen).
165. Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman).
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